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Abstract
The objective of this paper is to explain the mechanisms that have lead to the remarka-
ble improvement of the East German Housing Market during transition after the politi-
cal change in 1989 and the reunification of Germany in 1990. Theoretical analysis sug-
gests, that housing policy of the former GDR did not maximize consumer`s utility. So-
cialistic housing and construction policy limited the welfare with and distorted construc-
tion costs and rent control. The reason for that was not alone a lack of quantity but also 
a lack of quality and diversity. Therefore we argue that diversification of quality and te-
nure in the post communist era enhanced the welfare of consumers. We propose that 
welfare on the East German Housing market was significantly increased by creating a 
new variety of housing types and qualities which fits better with different preferences of 
the households. A filtering model predicts theoretically the observable trends of seg-
mentation and the development of a higher diversity of housing market segments. But 
additionally to the transition a bunch of subsidies were set up during transition. There-
fore the paper is focused on the interdependency between housing market subsidies, the 
supply cost function, the qualitative development of the housing stock and the choice of 
demand. Empirically we observe the change and qualitative improvement of housing 
conditions in East Germany during transition and quantitative effects like increased va-
cancy risk in a shifted hierarchy of housing qualities.__________________________________________________________________
3
1 Introduction
The consumption of housing is part of the households’ utility function and a key ele-
ment of the overall standard of living. In a general consumption function utility max-
imizing households chose the level of housing consumption according to their prefe-
rences subject to prices of housing, the price of overall consumption, maybe additional 
savings, and their income as budget constraint (Henderson and Ioannides 1986; Megbo-
lugbe et al. 1991). Higher incomes allow for increased housing consumption, but higher 
rents and generally increasing prices are counterbalancing this effect. Since the housing 
market may have several inefficiencies housing policy should contribute to a good allo-
cation. But ideological motivated misuse of housing policy instruments result in severe 
welfare  losses. This  was also  the  case  in the  German  Democratic  Republic  (GDR). 
Therefore this paper analyzes the transition of the East German housing market that was 
run down by decades of socialistic housing policy in a centrally planned economy. 
Unsustainable housing policy was responsible for the lack of housing quality in the 
German Democratic Republic (GDR). About 400.000 uninhabitable and vacant dwel-
lings1 are a testimonial for the disastrous housing conditions in the socialistic part of 
Germany. Poor revenues due to rent ceilings caused did not allow for renovation and 
caused wide deterioration of the existing housing stock. Especially historic buildings, 
old town quarters and neighborhoods in the city centers were in a dilapidated condition.
Instead of refurbishing the existing stock, the East German government preferred the 
construction of  new  industrially  prefabricated  housing  blocks  with similar  standard 
units. Whereas this type of housing matched with the ideal of a socialist city it did not 
always meet with population’s preferences. In fact, some authors describe the resent-
ments against the disastrous living conditions and urban blight as one of the important 
factors that lead to the peaceful revolution of 1989 (Kahl 1991, Schwarzbach 1991).
One can argue that East Germany’s supply function was restrained due to limited re-
sources in the housing market and therefore people did not find enough and no adequate 
space of living. Politicians in reunified Germany promised a fast process of conver-
gence in the standard of living between east and west, including the housing market. 
The strategy was to speed up the refurbishment of the housing stock by abundle of sub-
sidies for renovation, new construction and general urban renewal as well as financial 
support for home-buyers. The latter aimed to increase the share home-ownership, which 
was significantly below the West German average.
The objective of this paper is to provide economic explanations for the change of Hous-
ing quality in light of the transition to an open market economic and democratic system. 
This will be done with a filtering model that predicts theoretically the observable trends 
of segmentation and the development of a higher diversity of housing market segments. 
                                                  
1 Nagel and Preibisch (2002), 539__________________________________________________________________
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Theoretical analysis suggests, that housing policy of the former GDR did not maximize 
consumer`s utility. The reason for that was not alone a lack of quantity but also a lack of 
quality and diversity. Furthermore we argue that diversification of quality and tenure in 
the post communist era enhancedthe welfare of consumers. 
Empirically we observe the change and qualitative improvement of housing conditions 
in East Germany during transition. Since a former study (Michelsen/Weiß 2010) ad-
dressed  the  interdependency between housing  market subsidies and the quantitative 
reaction of supply, we now focus on the qualitative development of the housing stock 
and the choice of demand.
The paper proceeds with micro economic considerations the consequences of limited 
supply in a centrally planned economy for the utility of households. With a filtering 
model  we transfer the assumptions about socialistic housing policy in a theoretical 
framework of housing economics and derive statements about the expected develop-
ment of different qualities, including the question of home ownership. Section 3 pro-
vides an overview about different housing market subsidies according to different poli-
cy strategies. As one main reason for the failureof the GDR housing was the lack diver-
sity, subsidies that are able to create a greater variety of qualities should be a policy 
goal. We find out that the variety of subsidy programs supported the improvement of 
nearly every type of housing for all social and income levels. Section 4 is focused on 
empirical findings that can document changes of the housing market by several parame-
ters. Thereby we have a focus on housing quality and tenure and vacancy and judge the 
development in the light of predictions by the filtering model and considerations about 
the subsidy impact. In the last section we evaluate the outcome of housing market tran-
sitionand discuss implications for future housing policy. 
2 Theoretical Framework
2.1 Housing prefe rences limited allocation and utility.
It is obvious that East German housing policy and the planned economic system of 
German Democratic Republic was not able to fulfill population´s demand for decent 
housing standards. Regarding the limited housing quality supplied by state owned hous-
ing companies we suppose that these limitations of supply reduced welfare in this coun-
try.
To analyze the  welfare  contribution of  a diversified housing  market  with sufficient 
supply and different housing qualities we present a stylized framework of income and 
preferences in which households are optimizing their utility between housing and other 
consumption. 
The typical budget function of a household consist of housing, and a non housing good 
Z that consists of other consumption and savings.__________________________________________________________________
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Y= [(r) H] + Z where Z = [(p) C] + [S]
The variety of combinations of H and Z a household with same income can chose to
maximize his utility is usually depicted as an indifference curve. But different prefe-
rences of households may determine the position of the indifference curve. 
Figure  1 displays two different  types  of  households (A,B)  with  different preference 
structures at different utility levels (1-4).   Households of type A have a strong taste for 
housing at a good quality. Household of type Bprefer to spend a higher share of their 
income for the consumption of the Z good.
Z
Figure  1:  Preferences  and  Welfare –Restrictions through limited Supply in  the  GDR 
Housing Market
The vertical axis in figure 1 represents the quality level of housing units as a function of
size, interior and exterior quality.  The dotted line at hlim indicates the maximum hous-
ing quality supplied by GDR housing policy.
The horizontal axis represents the non housing good Z, which is not limited because 
savings are included.
The downward sloping line shows the possible budget distribution of households with 
the same income (y). 
Since optimal budget allocation results maximal utility if the budget line touches the in-
difference curve we find that household Bwith income y is fully satisfied at utility u2 in 
point (h By,zBy). Household A(y) in contrast can not the purchase the preferred level of 
housing quality (hAy) due to the limitation of supply. His best alternative is to chose the 
maximum level of Housing quality that is available on the market and spent the rest of 















u1 which is indicated by the indifference curve that crosses the budget line at hlim, result-
ing to an excess consumption zAex of non housing goods2.
Furthermore follows from this setting that an increase of income by shifting the budget 
line to the right can only lift the utility of type B households to u3or u4. Households of 
type A remain at u1 as long as hlim is the maximum quality of housing.
This example shows that an elastic supply is an important precondition to find an op-
timal allocation for all households.
We thereforesuppose that introduction of new housing policy and free market structures 
contribute to better allocation of housing. This could take place in several ways: 
(i) People with a high preference for housing quality became able to spend money for 
that, leading to increasing prices. 
(ii) The development of higher income groups allows construction Housing of higher 
quality.
(iii) Due to exogenous deterioration some of the stock formerly used decreases in quali-
ty and turns into vacancy.
2.2 Home ownership as a quality segment 
This neoclassical scheme is quite descriptive from a didactic point of view. But it neg-
lects that what features of housing drive the extend of utility in real life. Housing quality 
is surely defined by size and equipment of a flat. But dependent from the type of house-
hold there are also different utilities connected with renting or owning a flat. The analy-
sis of development and changes in tenure is especially interesting for East Germany, be-
cause ownership of property was rather proscribed in the GdR. Socialistic ideology with 
the main focus on rental housing is responsible for the big gap in home ownership rates 
between East and West Germany at the beginning of transition. Different studies and
explanations exist about the question why the share of Homeownership is different be-
tween countries. While countries like the U.S. Spain and Ireland most households pos-
sess the home they are living in countries like Germany or Austria and Switzerland 
more households are renting (Hilbers et al. , 2008 20). A good deal of this difference 
seems  to  be  related  to  institutional  basic  conditions  in  the  financial  sector 
(Jäger/Voigtländer 2006). It is widely accepted, that access to flexible and innovative 
mortgage products with low equity requirements make it easier for low income house-
                                                  
2 Households of type A were forced to spend their excess budget for additional consumption or to save it 
in a bank account. Since people were faced not only with limited housing supply was but also with a 
lack of the choice and de facto shortage of consumer goods it is not surprising that East Germanys 
collected savings were  able to generate  a demand boom after  reunification. The hypothesis of  en-
forced savings is also mentioned by Siebert (1993) due to insufficient supply in the retail sector.__________________________________________________________________
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holds to purchase property. In countries with a conservative mortgage system like Ger-
many banks are more risk-averse. Usually 20-40 % of the property value has to be fi-
nanced by own equity resulting to a generally lower home ownership rate. Furthermore 
regional wealth differences in Germanys like the price to income ratio or the price to 
rent ratio could have influenced the adjustment of the homeownership rate in East and 
West Germany. The aggregate decision of renting or buying (owning) a flat can be 
modeled in a purely financial approach based on a no- arbitrage condition that cost of 
renting must equal the total cost of owning a flat. But theoretical models based on this 
approach neglect that rental units are generally quite different from owner- occupied 
housing and that renters and owners are very different people (Glaeser Gyourko 2009, 
125). Owner occupied housing has some qualities besides physical elements that are 
able to generate excess returns for owning; for example independence from a landlord 
and the freedom to configure or redevelop the property. People with preferences for 
those qualities have difficulties to realize favored lifestyle in a planned market economy 
that was dominated by the rental sector. A catching up process in terms of home owner-
ship was expected because households which could not realize their wish for residential 
property during the time of the GDR regimes would probably try to get owners during 
transition. Access to subsidies should foster this development.
2.3 Graphical Filtering model
In the next step we integrate the situation of welfare loss, caused by socialistic housing 
policy into a filtering model and compare these outcomes with the long-run situation 
generated by the transition process. Filtering models in general assume, that households 
select from the variety of housing qualities according to household income to maximize 
their utility.3 Although housing is often defined as a durable good it is obvious that 
housing deteriorates with time and that a new dwelling has a higher quality than an old 
building. Finally the lowest quality housing segment is now fully depreciated and will 
be abandoned or demolished for new construction if in the meantime no rehabilitation 
takes place.
                                                  
3 Therefore high income households live in high quality flats and low income households at the bottom of 
the housing quality hierarchy. Another  finding is that  the long-run quality improvement rate ofthe 
housing stock should roughly match the long-run growth rate of real consumer income (Di Pasquale 
and Wheaton 1996, 237)__________________________________________________________________
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The resulting segmentation of qualities is a basic feature of filtering models and a lot of 
literature on housing quality builds on this concept.4 Different implications for housing 
policy can be derived from filtering models.5
To model the transition effect in the East German Housing Market we adopt the graphi-
cal explanation of a filtering model by Braid (1985). He examines different long-run 
steady state equilibriums for the diversity of housing quality that depend from bid-rents 
of households with different incomes and the gradient of an exogenous supply function 
that is based on construction costs and proportional increasing with housing quality. Our 
modulation is that we apply transition-related changes in the supply function and con-
sider different preferences.
He varies the shares of two household-types with different incomes and the number of 
initial qualities that can be built. In his model construction occurs at a quality Qc where 
the profits of constructing at this quality in terms of discounted future revenues turn to
zero. Potential revenues are indicated graphically by bid-rent curves. In a price quality 
diagram  Qc  is a point where  the bid-rent  curve  intersects  the supply  function  from 
above. Once build, a house deteriorates exogenously and turns will be abandoned by the 
investor when quality falls below a minimum level qv. 
Unlike Braid (1985) we analyze a housing market with a supply function that is dis-
torted by housing policy. Furthermore we do not assume that all consumers have the 
same utility function, but recognize different preferences for housing quality at the same 
income level modeled by the indifference curves in figure 1. We further assume that 
these preferences are constant over time.
                                                  
4 Firstly described by Ratcliff (1949) and discussed by Lowry (1960) Sweeny (1974) provided a model to 
test the  filtering  concept rigorously. He assumes an equilibrium in the housing market based on a 
hierarchy of quality segments it predicts demand reactions if the equilibrium is disturbed by adding 
or reducing the amount of  a distinct quality segment. If an urban renewal project that creates new 
housing of a special quality segment but also destroys old low quality housing Sweeny predicts rent 
price reductions in all quality segments above and an increase of the rents for segments below this 
special quality. See also the f urther  applications of the model by  Arnott  et  al. (1983)  and Braid 
(1981, 1984).
5 A famous hypothesis is that government subsidies targeted to the construction of high quality housing 
eventually benefit the poor, because high income households move to the new flats and the middle 
class move to the flats formerly occupied by the rich leaving the flats of medium quality free for the 
low income households. Similar results generate Anas and Arnott (1991) with an advanced simula-
tion method. In reality redevelopment takes places not only by replacing low quality dwellings but 
also by maintenance and rehabilitation. This phenomenon is examined by Arnott and Braid (1997). 
Their model predict that housing built at a high quality is downgrading to a minimum quality level 
and then rehabilitated to a medium quality level and then remaining in this low quality range accord-
ing to a perpetual rehabilitation  cycle. They  fi nd that subsidizing maintenance  cost lead to an in-
crease of housing quality for low income households.__________________________________________________________________
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Starting with the preferences we translate the two groups of households with equal in-
come but a different willingness to pay for housing quality measured by the share of in-
come. This results in two different bid rent curves P(q,u,y):6
P1(q,u,y) = y1- Z1  Umax(q; Z1 = y1/x 1) for qv< q < q1
P2(q,u,y) = y2- Z2 Umax  (q; Z2 = y2/x 2)  for q1< q < q2
With: 1< x1 < x2   and y1 =y2
The rent that a household would pay for a distinct quality depends from the optimal in-
come allocation on housing consumption H(q) and a non housing good Z defined by the 
preference parameter x. Housing consumption is measured as quality level by a norma-
lized unitq integrating space, equipment and other quality related features of a flat.
Households of type 1 spent a bigger share of income for the consumption of non hous-
ing goods and are therefore happy with a lower quality standard of their flat. 
Households of type 2 have greater taste for housing quality. They are probably less ma-
terialistic and will abstain rather from consumption of the non housing good. With the 
same income households of type 2 would purchase more housing quality.
As mentioned above the improvement of housing quality was one main political task 
within the transition process. The different policy instruments applied after transition 
have changed capital and construction costs (Michelsen/Weiß 2010). In figure 2 we ap-
ply the graphical filtering model to show the changes in average housing quality, vacan-
cy rates and  supply of different qualities, that come along with transition from socialis-
tic to current housing market conditions. The upper part of figure 2 show socialistic 
conditions. In the middle part we translate the impact of transformation in a changed 
supply function. After that we implement housing policy instruments that have been ap-
plied in the post transition period.
2.3.1 Filtering model of the socialistic housing market
To draw the socialistic supply-function we recall the socialistic housing policy that was 
focused on the stately mass construction of standard flats and make assumption about 
user costs at different qualities. Main instruments of GDR´s Marxist housing policy had 
been rent control and stately or cooperatively organized housing for a class less society 
within standard units at a homogeneous quality. Rent control should made new con-
structed standard housing quite affordable. The consequence of this setting is the stately 
construction of rental housing at quality level q1. Unlike in an equilibrium the level of 
                                                  
6 The bid-rent curve z = P(q,u,y) in  (g,z) space represents rent as  a  fu nction of housing quality that  a 
customer of income  y can  afford to  pay Consultant with attaining  utility level  u. Mathematically, 
P(q,u,y)= y –f(q,u), where f(q,u) is  the consumption of z that yields utility u  in combination  with 
housing consumtion q (Braid 1985).__________________________________________________________________
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q1 at which construction occurs is not defined by a bid rent curve and real supply cost, 
but by political decision.
To recapitulate the available quality spectrum within the GDR policy setting we start in 
the upper diagram A part in figure 2 from the left:  Recall that supply will be abandoned 
if offered rent is lower than supply cost.  All qualities left from the point Qv where the 
bid rent curve p1 intersects the supply function, which is determined by stately given 
rent level from below stay vacant because willingness to pay is less than fixed rent. Due 
to lack of maintenance real cost of supply might be at the lowest thinkable level, deter-
mined only fix operating expenses. 
The rent control policy is displayed by the dotted line, which represents a fixed rent lev-
el below average real supply cost. The result of this policy was that old flats that had 
undergone years of deterioration were not much cheaper than new build well equipped 
standard flats with an up to date quality. Therefore people queued to move in a new 
constructed flat.Waiting time should be considered as non-monetary cost of housing7.
The price for the loss due to the difference between rent and supply was reduced main-
tenance  resulting to  faster depreciation.  Due  to  rent control  renovation or supply at 
higherquality levels than q1 did not occur on the rental market neither by private sector 
nor by public housing.
For households that appreciated higher quality, home ownership was the only way to 
realize higher housing quality. But scarceness of construction material that had to be or-
ganized on the black market lead to very high construction costs in this segment.
Therefore the supply function of the socialistic housing market starts with marginal low 
cost increases per quality unit but takes an exponential course at a higher quality level.
Therefore willingness of p2 households is exhausted quite quickly at q2 which can be 
interpreted as the level of individually constructed housing during GDR times.
To the right from q1 the households with bid function p2 will outbid households of p1. 
Due to the gradient of the supply function the willingness to pay of household group 2 
is already exhausted at quality q2. The share of households in this group that can afford 
the preferred level of housing quality is very small. They have to allocate their income 
on housing at a lower quality and a higher than optimal share of non housing goods.
2.3.2 The effects of transition to market economy
Transition as systemic change means in the special case of GDR the monetary union 
and the political union with the federal republic of Germany. As a consequence all 
western goods were available very fast at market prices.  Purchasing of construction ma-
                                                  
7 There are various social reasons (e.g. benefits for young families) but also political reasons (party line 
loyalty) known that reduced waiting time for the households,  that had applied for a new flat.  __________________________________________________________________
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terials to invest in the high quality investment was not longer restricted.  This flattens 
supply function in the higher quality segment compared to the socialist housing market.
Transition means also especially for the housing market a stepwise abolishment of rent 
control and restitution of socialized property from the state to the former owners. As a 
consequence rents will converge to the real supply costs.  This leads to an increase of 
rents at the lower end of housing quality. Since rent revenues cover productions costs 
enough housing will be supplied so the in the market economic equilibrium there is no 
waiting time for housing anymore. Remember that bid rent curves remain unchanged as 
we assume fix preferences.8
To analyze the changes in housing quality segmentation we start again from the left of 
figure 2(part B). Due to the increased supply cost function the first intersection with the 
bid rent curve p1 occurs more to the right resulting to a higher quality level qv at which 
flats stay vacant. The shaded area can be interpreted also as a potential of additional 
homelessness compared to the socialist housing policy since households that were able 
to pay the low fixed rent under socialistic conditions are now faced with a higher rent 
above their willingness to pay. As a consequence they have to move but may not find 
another appropriate flat.  Other households are flexible enough and pay now a higher 
rent that lies within their willingness to pay. Some of them change the waiting time by a 
higher rent.  The bid rent curve p1 intersects the supply cost function somewhat more to 
the right. This means that new construction of the basic quality segment q1 occurs at  a 
higher quality  than  under socialistic conditions.  More supplier competition, cost effi-
ciency of private suppliers and their access to state of the art construction materials and 
technologies cause this effect. To meet the equilibrium condition  for a continuous hous-
ing quality spectrum  the bid rent curve of p2 households is shifted to the right so that it 
intersects supply costs from below at q1.
Due to the adjusted supply cost curvep2 would intersect the supply function again from 
above far more to the right. This means that new construction and renovation of type 2 
housing can take place at a higher quality level than under the socialistic setting. One 
important interpretation is that more households of group 2are now able to realize their 
preference for a higher level of housing quality.
The bid rent  functions  are determined not only by the preference of the  household 
scheme but also by income. Incomes have increased during transformation and studies 
show that income disparities have increased in East Germany (Grabka 2000). Therefore 
we can assume a third group of households with a bid rent P3 (q,u,y).  higher income 
than the households in group 1 and 2. We adopt the Braids assumption of housing as a 
normal good so that all high- income consumers live in higher quality level than all 
                                                  
8 The wind of change in socialistic societies and the fact of transition is the best evidence that political 
education and indoctrination of the population with the aim to develop streamlined preferences that 
fits with a socialistic urban ideal have failed. __________________________________________________________________
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lower – income consumers with the same preference order between Z and Q. But prefe-
rence order, determined by parameter x3 may be different.
The bid rent curve of high income consumers is higher and situated right from the oth-
ers.
P3 (q,u,y) = y3 - Z3 Umax  (q; Z3 = y3/x 3)  for q2< q < q3
With:1 > x3  and y3 > {y1,y2}
The graphical modelshows that the introduction of a higher income generates a  point 
q3 as new top quality constructed for high income consumers.
If we assume constant population the generation of a group with higher incomes results 
to a declining number of households in the lower income groups.  Additionally new 
housing constructed at q3 and q2 filters down to quality levels between qv and q1.  Since 
there are now more flats of that quality and the number of type 1 households is constant 
ordeclining qv should increase resulting in a higher vacancy rate.
2.3.3 Effects of housing policy beyond transition
Transition as a process was not be done by switching some basic regulations and institu-
tions. It was accompanied by housing policy instruments that are commonly used also 
in a market economy to prevent social imbalances and to reach distinct politic goals 
concerning housing standards.
As examples for policy actions we implement the social housing grants and a home 
ownership grant, general investment subsidies and the adoption of higher construction 
standards (energy efficiency, preservation order, building codes, safety at work)  
It can be assumed that average supply costs are increasing with regulation of construc-
tion standards.   Minimum standards  often have a fix  cost  characteristic.   Therefore 
supply cost would be increase especially in the lower quality segment. The higher quali-
ty segment may have implemented some aspects of regulation already before.
With investment grants and direct subsidies and tax deductions for renovation and new 
construction the supply cost of housing will be reduced. But housing policy probably 
would not subsidize neither unhealthy substandard flats. Therefore we assume a transi-
tional supply function that is higher at the left tail and has a flat gradient in the middle 
of the quality range where subsidies could reach the mass of population. At the right tail 
would supply cost would only be steeper than a supply function without housing subsi-
dies if there would be a kind of luxury tax.
But policy also subsidizes the households directly.  To reduce the risk of homelessness, 
that have been increased compared to the socialistic housing market government grants 
housing benefits to low income households.  This can graphically modeled by a upper __________________________________________________________________
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right shift of the bid rent curve p1. Also homeownership subsidies enlarge willingness 
to pay of the households modeled by a shift of bid rent curve p2. 
Figure 2c reveals the outcomes of a changed supply function:Social housing grants and 
investment incentives allow to build at a higher quality level for household group 1. As 
a consequence more households can afford flat with better quality and more flats at the 
lower quality range turn into vacancy. The level of qv has moved to the right compared 
to the former situations. That means a higher vacancy risk for flats of same quality 
compared to the situation in panel B. With the shift of bid rent curve p2 the quality level 
constructed for this household group q2 increases also. Even the quality level of luxury 
homes q3 increases, because high income households can profit by tax deductions that 
result in a flat gradient of supply cost curve. 
Under the assumption that households are mobile and move to flat with higher quality if 
they can keep up their optimal mix of housing and other consumption,new construction 
at a higher quality and renovation in all quality segments lead quickly to an increase of 
average housing quality used by the households. __________________________________________________________________
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2.3.4 The Process of Filtering during transition process
The first expectation that can be drawn from the filtering concept for the housing market 
in East Germany is an improvement of housing quality the higher income groups. We 
understand how GDR housing policy before 1990 provided construction of only two 
housing quality segments. The high quality segment of private home owners was very
small. The second quality was rental housing and consisted of comfortable apartments 
in new constructed blocks of flats, equipped with modern facilities like central heating, 
elevator and complete bathrooms. Of course there existed a third quality at the lower 
end of quality range but it was not constructed but the result of the filtering process. The 
low quality segment was located in the old housing stock in the inner city. These flats 
were poorly maintained and without modern facilities. While the fixed rent system al-
lowed only marginal nominal price differences between the quality segments the alloca-
tion of flats was regulated by an informal socialistic payment scheme of waiting, social 
criteria, and political privilege (Markuse 1991, 275f). 
The construction boom after reunification caused by housing subsidies that were given 
as tax allowances or direct grants has potential to lift up the quality in many dimensions. 
The new constructed flats are not only better because they newer. They provide also the 
latest technologies and individual flair that is mostly missing in the socialist style blocks 
of flats. Renovation of existing flats occurred at different intensity. 
Housing was graded up also by replacement and rehabilitation of deteriorated buildings. 
New constructed flats and renovated old town apartments now form the highest and 
medium quality segment. Since the renovation cost of historic buildings reach or exag-
gerates the price of new construction we do not expect that low quality housing will be 
the result. The low quality segment is located within the socialist housing stock and the 
old town apartment houses where just simple maintenance and basic renovations take 
place. The rest of the stock which is not maintained and that people leave to higher 
qualities is doomed to deterioration and vacancy. Figure 3 shows the directions how 
quality segments  may  have shifted during  the transition process between  1990  and 
2010. If we take into account the combinations depicted by the connecting lines in fig-
ure 2 the new quality spectrum is much broader than the three stages low medium and 
high. This argument considers that consumers may have not only a taste for a distinct 
quality but also for a special kind of architecture or building type. __________________________________________________________________
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Figure 3: Filtering Model of the East German Housing market during transition
It is widely accepted, that the housing policy of the GDR with stately controlled alloca-
tion of flats implicated a well balanced social structure. I.e. the location of residence 
was not correlated with income. But as seen in section 2 this situation is mediocresince 
a greater supply with possibility of choice should be welfare enhancing. The transition 
to a market economy and investment subsidies changed the initial situation. Filtering 
theory suggests that high income households outbid lower income households and move 
into the newly high quality housing segments supplied by subsidized urban renewal 
projects. Also the middle class selects a new or renovated flat in medium quality. It may 
also be the case that their current flat is renovated to a medium quality. Low income 
households on the contrary do not move or move to similar flats as they used to live be-
fore housing market transition. In fact they have the possibility to occupy the best flats 
within the low quality segment which means that the remaining flats go into vacancy. 
This process of passive segregation and connected problems has been reported (Hill and 
Wiest 2004). 
But what does this mean for the average quality of the housing stock in East Germany? 
If we follow this development of a wider spread of qualities, where only low income 
households remain at their initial level we expect on average a higher quality level.
The subsidized new supply makes high quality housing more affordable. But also the 
increasing real incomeof households contributes to the improvement of housing.__________________________________________________________________
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3 Housing Subsidies in East Germany:
Housing subsidies can be defined as government actions that reduce the relative cost for 
production or consumption of housing (Haffner and Oxley 1999). Direct grants, loans, 
tax incentives and also non fiscal policies like rent control are typical instruments of 
housing policy. Most important aspects of housing policies are laws for rent regulation, 
public and social housing, investment subsidies as well as housing grants. 
We examine these policy instruments in regard to their relevance for the discussion 
around the improvement of housing conditions. 
 Rent regulation
Policies of rent regulation are generally accused of reducing welfare because 
they often cause an undersupply of housing (Gyourko and Linneman, 1989) , 
misallocation of housing supply to households types (Glaeser and Luttmer 2003) 
and to urban areas i.e. quality segments (Hackner and Nyberg 2000) as well as 
negative  impacts on  maintenance of  the housing  stock  (Albon  and  Stafford 
1990).
9East Germany´s housing market system with fixed rent levels has under-
gone a fundamental deregulation in the transition from a centrally planned econ-
omy to market economy. For the existing housing stock this process was regu-
lated by the rent level adjustment law that defined the steps of rent increase until 
1998 (Jenkis 1996, 711f). The current rent law limits the gradient of increase but 
not the level of rent price. We therefore assume a free rental and housing market 
and can neglect marginal regulations by the rent law (MietG). This deregulation 
should have improved the condition for renovation and the improvement of liv-
ing conditions.
 Public and Social Housing
In Germany social housing is not solely part of the public housing stock. It can 
also be provided by private landlords.10 The social housing subsidy is more or 
less organized as kind of an earmarked investment subsidy for which every in-
vestor can apply. After a series of reforms11 the instrument is mainly focused on 
the creation of flats for people that are not able to find an appropriate flat on the 
                                                  
9 See also Olsen (1972), Fraser Institute (1975) and Downs (1988).
10 At the same time local public housing companies are engaged in the free housing marked, competing 
with private landlords.
11 The last reforms were the replacement of the Second Housing construction law (II.WBauG)  by the 
housing support law (WoFG) in 2002 and the assignment of the full responsibility for social housing 
to the federal states in 2006. Since 2007 the federal government has declared to pay an annual fix 
amount of 512 Mio Euro to the federal states as lump-sum compensation (BMF 2007, 38).__________________________________________________________________
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free housing market (Kühne-Büning et al. 2005, 283ff). We analyze social hous-
ing subsidies together with general investment subsidies.
 Investment Subsidies
The variety of investment subsidies including grants for renovation and different 
tax  allowances  form  the  most  important housing policy instruments.  The  in-
vestment subsidies target the supply side by reducing the construction cost or the 
expected rate of return.12 These subsidies contributed significantly to the change 
of housing stock. Therefore we expect that investment subsidies play also an 
important role to explain changes of housing consumption in East Germany. To-
gether with subsidies for social housing we focus on these investment subsidies
and  tax  allowances  to  analyze  the  development  of  housing  quality.
 Housing Grants
The policy instrument of direct housing grants for low-income households is 
aimed  at the  demand-side.  The  recipients of  earmarked allowances get  their
money to choose autonomously a flat in the market. This kind of subjective sub-
sidy is supposed to cause less distortion in the housing market than rent regula-
tions or investment grants (Eekhoff 2002, 175ff). Thus,housing grants formpart 
of the disposable income. After a reform of the social security system the costs 
for housing are included in the social benefits vulgo Hartz IV. Since these subsi-
dies are strongly embedded in the social transfer system and hardly to separate 
we neglect the subsidization by direct housing grants in the rest of the paper.
3.1 Design of subsidy groups by Policy strategies 
The  literature about  investment subsidy evaluation contains different approaches to 
classify or distinguish subsidy groups. Very common but not very accurate is a classifi-
cation of subsidies in technical and fiscal dimensions. These approaches differentiate
between the political subdivision that issues the subsidy or distinguish between tax in-
centive and direct financial grants (Boss / Rosenschon 2008). Our approach in contrast 
should reflect the political intention that was crucial to issue a special type of subsidy. 
This method should help to clarify the impact of these subsidies. Therefore we try to 
find a classification of the housing expenditures based on policy strategies. 
The principles of housing policy were formulated in the 1950s, when Germany was
faced with very poor housing conditions in the aftermath of World War II. The housing 
shortage was a social problem and the supply of people with adequate and sufficient 
housing  an urgent task. To fulfill  this challenging  reconstruction of  the  mainly de-
                                                  
12 In a previous paper we analyzed subsidy impacts on supply and propose that the massive investment 
subsidy triggered construction activity resulting to a to high vacancy level and negative price shocks 
in the short run (Michelsen and Weiß 2010).__________________________________________________________________
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stroyed housing stock, politicians pursued a doubled strategy to address different target 
groups. First social housing should help to accommodate low income households. Se-
condly home ownership was supported with a focus on family orientated homes (Kor-
nemann 1996, 126f). Reviewing 40 years of policy both strategies were modified only 
gradually in terms of policy instruments but remained fundamentally the same (Korne-
mann 1996, 141). 
As a consequence of political path dependency these two main aspects of the West 
German housing policy were transferred to East Germany after the reunification. Ac-
cording to these two strands of policy we identify and compare those subsidies which
improve the housing stock in general to those which aim to increase the level of home 
ownership. Although the subsidies for homeowners are also used for new construction 
and renovation of flats and dwellings, their main aim is to increase ownership rates. 
Subsidies in the first group address mainly the market of rented flats. Within these sub-
sidy groups exist a lot of different programs to address the different needs and different 
preferences of households.
Most of the information presented here stems from the subsidy reports of the federal 
government  (BMF  1991-2008). We  account  for the  reported subsidies  in the period 
1990 to 2008. This allows us to trace the impact of reunification and the following tran-
sition process in East Germany. We must concentrate on the housing subsidies provided 
by the federal government, because of the unmanageable amount of different programs 
and special funds that are provided by the federal states and which are not documented 
systematically13.
3.2 Urban renewal and Housing policy related subsidies:
We identify a group of subsidies for urban renewal, renovation and new construction 
that allows investment in new and existing rented flats and collect them in table 1. The 
criterion for a subsidy to be sorted in this group is that it is not exclusively dedicated to 
support homeownership. We find direct grants for renovation, credits and tax allow-
ances according to the classification of the subsidy reports of the federal government 
(BMF 1991-2008). 
                                                  
13 Indeed, also in the federal subsidy reports exist some inconsistencies. Some allowances are counted as 
a subsidy in  a later report but  were not  counted before (BMF 2007, 15). Generally this  problem 
seems to be insignifcant (Boss and Rosenschon 2008). But in the special case of housing related sub-
sidies the practice of the subsidy reports neglected the urban renewal grants until 2003. In the  fol-
lowing years one third of the expenditures for urban renewal was declared as a housing subsidy that 
is paid finally to private households and investors (BMF 2006). We therefore used other documents 
e.g. administrative agreements and an urban renewal report (BMVBS 2004) to get information about 
the expenditures of urban renewal for the former years.__________________________________________________________________
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As mentioned above social housing subsidies were adapted to East Germany, but with
regard to special need of the specific situation. Because of the dilapidated stock social 
housing subsidies were not only dedicated to build new flats but also for renovation and 
modernization within the available housing stock. Furthermore the expenditures for so-
cial housing in East Germany are completely direct grants. That is different from West 
Germany, where a relevant part of the subsidies is given as credits with reduced interest 
rates.
Urban renewal programs foster the adjustment of the poor housing conditions in terms 
of the residential environment quality. About one third of the urban renewal subsidies 
are estimated as subsidy to private investors. Since urban renewal areas are rather inner 
city or old town quarters with apartment houses rather than neighborhoods with single 
family homes we sort this subsidy in the first group.
Several other credit programs and allowances for the modernization and construction of 
flats were issued for East Germany. These are namely the Housing Modernization Cre-
dit Programs I and II of the state owned bank KFW and ad hoc programs with direct 
grants for the completion and new construction of rented flats. 
To improve the housing conditions very quickly the Assist Area Act was passed to sup-
port renovation and new construction investments in East Germany by a very effective 
tax subsidy. Between 1992 and 1998 it was possible to write of up to 50 percent of a 
real estate investment within the first 5 years. Es pecially high income households were 
attracted by the tax deductions. Since this group of wealthy people mostly already had 
an own home the Assist Area Act was used much stronger for investments in rented 
flats than for owner occupied flats. Therewith connected is a notable stream of West 
German private capital into the East German Housing market. In 1999 Later on this ex-
tensive tax subsidy was reformed by the Investment Grant Act (InvZulG). The new in-
strument consists of tax-free grants that are limited to a percentage of the investment 
cost according to the kind of investment. The new regulation that was in duty until 2004 
had a strong focus on inner city areas and the renovation of historic buildings. 
The variety and liberal allocation of housing subsidies in East Germany offered support 
for nearly every type of housing to build up a diverse supply for all social and income 
levels. In the diversified market of West Germany subsidies wereconcentrated on social 
housing for lower income households, local neighborhood problems (Urban renewal) 
and energy efficiency (CO2-Reduction).
Not all subsidies are explicitly attributable to East or West Germany because the subsi-
dy reports do not split of the regional allocation of these expenditures. These are special 
tax allowances for ecologic renovations and investment in historic monuments or within 
formally designated redevelopment areas, several subsidies for energy saving invest-
ments within the housing stock and some  smaller programs supporting the construction 
of additional flats.__________________________________________________________________
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Ta ble 1: Subsidy Programs for renovation and new construction
Subsidy Programs for renovation and new construction
Amount 




Social Housing 12511.0 Grant
Urban renewal program 490.5 Grant






Urban renewal program 1753.2 Grant
KFW Modernization Program I &II 6879.63 Credit
Other Construction subsidies (Completion of construction works of 
rented flats started before reunification and renovation and rehabili-
tation within the existing housing stock)
832.9 Grant
Assist Area Act / Investment Grant Act (rented flats) 4254.0 Tax allowance
Sum 18321.2
No documentation of regional allocation 
Support of historic monuments and private investment within urban 
renewal areas 606.4 Tax allowance
Renovation subsidies for energy saving investments 2503.4
Credit 
Tax Allowance




Data Source: Federal ministry of finance (BMF); Federal Ministry for Transport, Construction 
and Urban Renewal; Compilation and calculation by the authors
3.3 Home ownership policy related subsidies:
In the second group we collect the subsidies that support the renovation and new con-
struction of owner occupied housing. Table 2 displays the allocation of these subsidies 
to East and West Germany as far as possible. While more subsidies passed on to West 
Germany in East Germany there have been more particular programs. These subsidies 
for home-buyers and privatization strategies addressed the low home ownership rate in 
East Germany. 
At the beginning of the 1990s a small ad hoc program supported the completion of con-
struction works of single family homes started before the reunification. A further sup-
port of home ownership for East Germany was connected with the partial privatization 
of the public housing companies. Renters that were willing to buy their own flat were 
supported by this program. Also the part of the tax allowances for owner occupied flats 
by the assist area act is added solely to East Germany.__________________________________________________________________
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Ta ble 2: Home-ownership related subsidy programs
Home-ownership related subsidy programs
Amount 









st Homebuyer subsidy (EigZulG) 8086.8 Tax allowance
Assist Area Act & Investment Grant Act (owner-occupied flats) 894.6 Tax allowance
Privatization of public housing to renters 160,1 Grant 




No documentation of regional allocation 
Previous Homebuyer subsidies (§7b EstG, § 10e EstG) 23341.7 Tax allowance
Sum 23341.7
Data Source: Federal ministry of finance (BMF); Compilation and calculation by the au-
thors
The home ownership grant act (EigZulG) is the biggest subsidy in the 1990s aimed to 
enable more low income households to buy or build an owner occupied home (Korne-
mann 2000). In contrast to the former regulations of the income tax law (§ 7b EStGB, § 
10e  EStG)  the  home ownership grant is  independent  from the progression  rate. Al-
though this subsidy has no regional limitation we find another study that showed that 
about 23 % of the expenditures is connected with investments in East Germany (Färber 
2003, 20).
We did not find any documentation about the regional allocation of the previous home 
ownership tax subsidies (§7b EstG, § 10e EstG). However, these subsidies are fading
out during the examination period. A good deal of this tax losses occurring in the 1990s 
in caused by deductions for homes constructed in West Germany before 1990and there-
fore not so relevant for the evaluation of transition related changes in East Germany.__________________________________________________________________
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4 Empirical findings
4.1 The development of housing conditions during transition 
This section describes the development of housing conditions in both parts of Germany 
after the reunification. We present the renovation status and the equipment of flats as 
purely quality orientated indicators and living space per person and the satisfaction with 
the size of the flat as in indicators for quantitative housing consumption.
The indicators of housing quality presented here are mainly taken from German Socioe-
conomic panel survey. The results are weighted with appropriate factors to get a repre-
sentative picture from the sample of about 12000 households. Additionally we refer to 
census data.14 To value the success of the adjustment process, we compare with the East 
German results West German values of the indicators. 
Figure 4displays the development of renovation status of buildings and the equipment 
with central heating and balconies as indicators for housing quality. The status of reno-
vation in East Germany has significantly increased especially during the second half of 
the 1990s. Since 2004 the share of East German households that live in a well renovated 
house is similar to West Germany at around 70 %. 
Figure 4: Share of statements about good renovation, Equipment status and subsidies for 
renovation and new construction. Data Source: Authors´ calculations; Socio Economic 
Panel.
The improvement of housing quality is also visible in the equipment of flats. New cen-
tral heating facilities made housing more convenient and improved also energy efficien-
cy and reduced the pollution connected with coal heating. We observe an increase of 
                                                  
14 Another data source  about the development of the housing quality in East  Germany is the  Housing 
Stock Panel which was performed by the Federal Research Agency for Spatial Planning This survey 
provides a detailed analysis about the renovation activity within a sample of about 7500 flats in 1000 
houses (Osenberg and Waltersbacher 1997; Strubelt et al.1998).
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households moving in flats that are equipped with central heating. East German house-
holds catch up to the West German level that is nearly constant at more than 90% of all 
households with central eating.
Also the share of households with a balcony or terrace, which can be seen as an element 
of convenience is also increasing in East Germany. But there is still a significant gap 
compared to West Germany in the 2005 values of this indicator. The difference is prob-
ably caused by a different building structure i.e. more apartment houses and higher av-
erage age of buildings in East Germany. Balconies or terraces are difficult to integrate 
into an existing structure.
Also the quantitative living standard of East German Households has increased as we 
show in figure 5. The consumption of living space per person is continuously rising in 
Germany. In 1965 Statistics for West Germany report 22.3 sqm per capita in 1965 and 
32,6 in 1980 (Stat. Bundesamt 2000, 70). Unfortunately there are no reliable statistics 
about the development in socialistic East Germany but the low level of 29.5 sqm in 
1993 which is a gap of 8.3 sqm (22%) to the West German level revealed that the socia-
listic housing policy did not offer enough supply of habitable flats.15 With the transfor-
mation process after the reunification the housing space consumption per capita jumped 
especially in the late 1990s when the mass of the new and renovated supply came into 
the market. But in 2006 there is still a gap of about 5.4 sqm (12%) to the West German 


































































































Living Space per Capita too small right size too large
Figure 5: Living Space per capita and households´ satisfaction with  the size  of the flat.
Data Source: Authors’ calculations Federal bureau of statistics, Socio Economic Panel
Concerning the disparities in living space per capita it seems somewhat surprising that 
the satisfaction with the size of the flat in East Germany was only a few percent lower 
than in West Germany in the early 1990s. Since 1999 the share of households that are 
satisfied with their size of living space is even higher than in West Germany. Figure 4 
                                                  
15 This is remarkable because the statistical number of  fl ats per inhabitant  were higher than in West 
Germany in every period since 1950 (Stat. Bundesamt 2000, 54). The dilapidated state of many 
houses forced the population to move closer together.
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shows the slight increase of this value for East Germany and the according decrease of 
households that state their flat as too small. In West Germany the satisfaction with the 
size of the flat is stagnating. In both parts of Germany a small but slightly increasing 
share of households thinks that their flat is too big.
The high level of satisfaction with the space of the flat in East Germany contradicts the 
catch up process in terms of living space at the first look. But table 3 reveals a higher 
income elasticity of demand for living space between 1993 and 2006 in West Germany. 
That could mean less taste for living space in East Germany. The stronger adjustment of 
these indicators housing indicators (Figure 3) may also reveal a stronger preference for 
the improvement of housing quality. It is also possible that this development is based on 
a path dependency caused by the initial housing quality situation in 1990 and the fol-
lowing renovation subsidies and the increase of rents. Also a demographic process de-
velopment resulting to a higher share of single households and so called “empty nester 
households” where children have left the home of their parents may explain somewhat 
the growth of living space per capita.
Ta ble 3 Income elasticity of demand for living space per capita 1993-2006
Growth  West East
Per Capita Living Space Growth in % 19,2% 31,7%
Per capita Real Disposable income Growth in % 5,7% 16,8%
Income elasticity 3,36 1,89
Data Source: Authors´ Calculations; Federal bureau of statistics Economic 
According to the selected housing quality indicators we can state, that the housing situa-
tion has been improved in East Germany. Quality indicators that are connected with in-
vestor decisions like the renovation status and equipment with central facilities seem to 
reach saturation like in West Germany due to support by subsidies. But there is still a 
gap in terms of living space consumption. Considering the correlation between housing 
consumption and income, the remaining gap can be explained by the remaining income 
disparity between East and West Germany. It is very obvious that subsidization of hous-
ing construction and the creation of a wider quality range enabled households to select a 
flat according to their preferences and income.
4.2 The changes of homeownership during transition 
In this section we describe the changes of Home Ownership Rates in East Germany af-
ter the reunification and compare it with the development in West Germany.
The data of the SOEP revealed that the share of home owners in East Germany in-
creased quite strongly from about 30% to nearly 40% between 1995 and 2006. Increase 
in West Germany was much lower from about 45% & to nearly 50% despite the mas-
sive support by the home ownership grant act in this period. __________________________________________________________________
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Figure 6: Shares of homeowners and single family homes and home ownership supporting 
subsidies. Data Source: Authors calculations; BMF; Socio Economic Panel
This supports the thesis of a catching up effect of East German households to purchase 
residential property. But the majority of this increase took place in the 1990s. We see, 
that home ownership rate is nearly stagnating after the year 2000. Although home own-
ership rate has increased strongly, it is obvious that East Germany is still lagging behind 
compared with West Germany in this point. It seems that the potential for home owner-
ship within the East German Housing market is somewhat limited due to economic ca-
pabilities of households and the good qualities offered by the rental housing market.
The development of a higher home ownership rate may have consequences on the living 
space consumption and the structure of the city. The consumption of living space per 
capita is highly connected with the modus of tenure. Owner-occupier households in 
general show higher living space consumption than tenant households. The reason is 
that  owner  occupiers  are  wealthier  on  average  and  purchase  mostly  single  family 
homes. Indeed, single-family homes and two family houses are usually constructed for 
home buyers and not for renters. Therefore we expect a high correlation with the share 
of houses with one or two flats from the housing stock. But the relation between the in-
crease in one and 2-family houses with the development of the residential property rate 
is ambiguous. 
In West Germany the share of single family homes is very closed to the share of home 
owners, but in East Germany home ownership rate increased stronger than the share of 
single family and detached homes. This may be due to the fact that residential property 
is increasingly realized within the existing housing stock. An evaluation of the Home 
buyer subsidy reports that about 44% of the supported households purchased a new con-
structed home (ARGEBAU, 2002). On the other hand, attempts to privatize a good deal 
of the East German public housing stock to the renters were not very successful.
Another hint to the distortion relation of detached single family homes and the home 
ownership rate reveals a look on the allocation of subsidies. Subsidies for renovation 
and new construction that favored mainly the sector of apartment housing are summed 
up 18.2 billion Euros for East Germany (table 1). This is the double of home ownership 
related subsidies in table 2 with a sumof 9.1 billion Euros. As we described in an earlier 
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paper a subsidy driven investment boom caused an oversupply and high vacancy rates
in the East German rented housing sector (Michelsen /Weiß 2010). This is probably dis-
turbing the natural relationship between home-ownership rate and the share of detached
single family homes.
The high share of vacant apartments can also be seen as a result of the filteringprocess. 
The ability of tenure choice and the implementation of Homeownership subsidies en-
hanced the supply structure of different housing qualities. Consequently maximizing 
their individual utility a lot of households in East Germany took the chance to be own-
ers, which was very difficult and suppressed by socialistic housing policy during the 
GDR-Time. They moved out from flats that obviously do not meet the preferences of 
demand.
4.3 High vacancy – the other side of the coin 
The latter sections document that the situation on the East German property market had 
clearly changed compared to the situation at the breakdown of the socialistic system. A 
lot of indicators for housing quality and homeownership are converging to the west val-
ues.  But the improvement process comes along with another problem. The filtering 
model presented in section 2.2 predicts increasing vacancy in the lowest quality seg-
ments when more homes are constructed at a higher quality.  That is firstly because 
more flats are filtering down to qualities for low income household and secondly with 
general increase of higher incomes the share of low income people may decline with
willingness to pay for low quality housing will decline. The increase of vacancy started 
rapidly in the second half of the 1990s with a doubling of the vacancy rate from about 
6.5% to about 13.2% between 1995 and 1998 (Pfeiffer et al. 2000). Different surveys on 
the distribution of vacancy in different housing segments confirm the presumption made 
by the filtering model. These studies reveal that flats with a worse renovation state are 
more often vacant that modernized flats (Table 4).
Furthermore vacancy is concentrated in old buildings that mostly situated in inner city 
homogenous old towns quarters but also in the segment of apartment houses that were 
build during GDR time. It is likely and follows from the filtering model that the vacant 
housing segments do not match the preferences of the households respectively that there 
are not enough households with demand for low quality housing. The high vacancy rate 
is an obstacle for further urban development because it causes several negative external-
ities on residential environment,social structure, real estate values and investment.  
On account of the durability of housing and the demographic trends with stagnating and 
even declining number of households demolition seems to be the only possibility to re-
duce the extreme vacancy in the low quality segment. The support of renovations of 
empty flats in old buildings is probably no alternative, because this would generate new 
empty state in the segments that now are still inhabited.__________________________________________________________________
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Ta ble 4: Vacancy rates in East Germany by housing market segments in 2005/2006
Survey Housing Companies
1 Survey municipalities
Year of construction Vacancy rate Location Vacancy rate
before 1919 44%
Old Town Quarters 19% 1919-1948 20%
1949-1969 8%
1970-1990 13% GDR-Housing 14%
since 1991 7% other 7%
Survey among
Housing Companies Private Landlords
Status of modernization Vacancy rate Vacancy rate 
no renovation / modernization 46% 76 %
partially renovated / modernized 15% 19%
fully renovated / modernized 6% 11%
total 13% 20%
Data Source: Authors´ Compilation; Liebmann et al. (2007, 28); Beckmann et al. (2008, 205; 220)
5 Concluding Remarks
The aim of this paper was to explain the mechanisms that have led to the remarkable
improvement of housing quality in East Germany during transition after the political 
change in 1989 and the reunification of Germany in 1990.
We propose  that  welfare on the  East  German  Housing  market  was si gnificantly  in-
creased by creating a new variety of housing types and qualities which fits better with 
different preferences of the households. Socialistic Housing and construction policy li-
mited the welfare with distorted construction costs and rent control.
The description of the housing quality structure with a filtering model makes clear how 
construction quality levels change from a socialistic to a market economic environment. 
The integration of an expansive and liberate housing policy that leads to a flatter con-
struction cost curve shows first that constructed qualities are higher than without subsi-
dies and second that the vacancy risk for flats with same quality is higher compared to a 
situation without subsidies.
In the empirical part of the paper we analyze the development of several indicators of 
housing quality and the amount of subsidies for renovation and new construction in East__________________________________________________________________
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Germany that was predominantly increasing until 2001 and was later continuously re-
duced. This means that the East German Housing market was favored much stronger 
than the housing market in West Germany where subsidies were reduced earlier and 
were also mostly lower, especially if the subsidies would be measured per households or 
per capita. The indicators presented in the latter sections show unambiguously that East 
German households were able to improve their housing conditions significantly during 
the transition  process  after the  reunification.  This statement  holds  for the quality  in 
terms of technical equipment, renovation state and average living space consumption 
per capita. This regional allocation was expected because the political goal was to im-
prove the East German housing conditions with the West German level as a benchmark.
There have been two signals to start fading out special subsidies for the East German 
housing  market. The  first  reason is t he  approximation of housing quality  indicators
compared to West Germany and the other reason is the upcoming vacancy, making clear
the success of higher housing qualities is only the one side of a coin. The policy to satis-
fy high demand for housing in the early 1990 has led to a notable oversupply of housing
in many regions. It is hard to say, whether policy reacted to reluctant in cutting back 
subsidies. In any case, the change is reflected by a reduction of expansive housing sub-
sidies since the late 1990s. 
Also the homeownership rate has increased. Since owner occupied property was pro-
scribed and partially socialized in GDR most East German Households lived in rented 
flats and had therefore no influence on the housing stock investment. To change this and 
to increase social responsibility and connectivity to the urban environment it seems to 
be a good strategy to support home ownership in East Germany. 
But the level of households living in an own home still doesn’t reach the West German 
level. The risk of oversupply and decreasing property prices limits the probability for 
further increase of homeownership in East Germany. Therefore subsidies for new con-
struction and home ownership are no current policy instrument any more. It seems that 
the potential for home ownership within the East German Housing market is somewhat 
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